Environmental Law, Eleventh Circuit Survey by Trimble, Travis M.
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law 
Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 
1-1-2006 
Environmental Law, Eleventh Circuit Survey 
Travis M. Trimble 
University of Georgia, ttrimble@uga.edu 
 
Repository Citation 
Travis M. Trimble, Environmental Law, Eleventh Circuit Survey (2006), 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/810 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Georgia 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ 
Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more information, please contact 
tstriepe@uga.edu. 
Environmental Law
by Travis M. Trimble*
In 2005 the Eleventh Circuit courts addressed issues of regulatory
interpretation of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”);1 compliance with the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)2 in connection with the
development of wetlands; and a conflict between the Federal Emergency
Management Agency’s (“FEMA”) coastal flood insurance program and
the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).3 First, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals invalidated a rule of the Alabama Department of Environ-
mental Management that exempted certain stack emissions that
otherwise violated the State Implementation Plan under the CAA.4
Also, the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Alabama heard one of several cases arising out of an enforcement
dispute between the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and
power companies over the companies’ upgrades to existing power
plants.5 The court held that, for purposes of the EPA’s rule excluding
routine maintenance, repair, or replacement projects from the CAA’s pre-
construction permit requirement, any project that is routine throughout
the industry and does not increase the maximum hourly capacity of the
plant to emit pollutants can qualify for the exclusion.6 In a case
concerning the Clean Water Act (“CWA”)7 and NEPA, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida ruled that the United
States Corps of Engineers, in issuing a CWA section 404 permit allowing
a county to fill jurisdictional waters for development, had improperly
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. Former partner in the firm
of Anderson, Walker & Reichert, LLP, Macon, Georgia. Mercer University (B.A., 1986);
University of North Carolina (M.A., 1988); University of Georgia (J.D., 1993).
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
4. Sierra Club v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 430 F.3d 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2005).
5. United States v. Alabama Power Co., 372 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1285 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
6. Id. at 1307.
7. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
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segmented a portion of the development from the larger development
plan for permitting purposes.8 Additionally, the court held that the
Corps improperly concluded that an Environmental Impact Statement
was not even required for the segmented portion.9 Finally, in an ESA
case, the Southern District of Florida enjoined FEMA from administering
its National Flood Insurance Program in portions of the Florida Keys
because the plan facilitated development that degraded the habitat of
several endangered or threatened species.10
I. CLEAN AIR ACT
In Sierra Club v. Tennessee Valley Authority,11 the Eleventh Circuit
held that a regulatory safe harbor first established informally, and then
formally, by the Alabama Department of Environmental Management
(“ADEM”), which exempted “de minimis” violations of the stack
emissions opacity requirement under Alabama’s State Implementation
Plan (“SIP”) of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”),12 was an illegal modification
of the SIP and was thus invalid.13 The court also held that opacity
data from a continuous opacity monitoring system (“COMS”) could not
be used to establish violations of the opacity rule prior to May 20,
1999.14 Finally, the court held that sovereign immunity protected the
Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”) from the assessment of civil
penalties.15
Alabama maintains a SIP administered by ADEM to enforce the
national ambient air quality standards developed by the EPA under the
CAA.16 One of the SIP regulations prohibits the discharge of particu-
late matter of greater than twenty percent opacity.17 Also, under the
SIP, the approved method of measuring opacity is known as “Method 9,”
which is essentially a visual observation by a certified observer.18
8. Florida Wildlife Fed. v. United States Army Corps of Eng., 401 F. Supp. 2d 1298,
1304-05, 1313, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
9. Id. at 1323-33.
10. Florida Key Deer v. Brown, 364 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348-49, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
11. 430 F.3d 1337 (11th Cir. 2005).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7661 (2000).
13. 430 F.3d at 1339-40.
14. Id. at 1340.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1341.
17. Id. The court explained that opacity is a measure of the extent that a plume of
smoke reduces the transmission of light. Id. A plume with twenty percent opacity blocks
twenty percent of light passing through it. Id.
18. Id. at 1341-42. The court noted that Method 9 has limited effectiveness because
a typical source is tested not more than fifteen times a year and cannot be tested at night.
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Around October 2002, ADEM began informally applying a two percent
de minimis rule as a safe harbor from the twenty percent opacity limit.
Under this rule, stack emissions, as measured by COMS, were allowed
to exceed the opacity limit for up to two percent of the plant’s total
operating hours in each quarter. ADEM formally adopted this rule as a
regulation in October 2003.19
Also, in May 1999, ADEM adopted a “credible evidence rule” that
allowed a regulatory violation of the SIP to be established by “any
credible evidence or information.”20 The EPA mandated that each state
with a SIP adopt such a rule to clarify that a test method expressly
included in a SIP, such as Method 9, was not to be the exclusive method
by which a violation could be established.21
The subject of the lawsuit in Sierra Club was a TVA operated power
plant in Colbert, Alabama. As part of its operating permit, the TVA was
required to install and maintain a COMS in each of the plant’s
stacks.22 The TVA used the COMS data, among other things, to take
advantage of the two percent de minimis rule.23 Seeking declaratory
relief, injunctive relief, and civil penalities, the Sierra Club and the
Alabama Environmental Council sued the TVA in September 2002,
alleging that from 1997 through 2002 there were 8,933 violations of the
twenty percent opacity limit set out in the SIP. The plaintiffs used the
TVA’s COMS data, which was submitted to ADEM in connection with
the de minimis rule, to establish the violations.24
The Eleventh Circuit court reversed the grant of summary judgment
based on the two percent de minimis rule.25 The court noted that the
CAA prevents a state from unilaterally modifying a SIP regulation
without EPA approval.26 Because ADEM’s two percent de minimis rule
had never been submitted to the EPA for approval and because the rule
effectively modified the twenty percent opacity limitation in the SIP by
allowing emissions to exceed the limit for up to two percent of the plant’s




20. Id. at 1342-43.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1340.
23. Id. at 1342.
24. Id. at 1339, 1343.
25. Id. at 1349, 1357.
26. Id. at 1346.
27. Id. at 1349. The court stated that:
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As to the alleged violations that occurred prior to May 20, 1999,28
however, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. The court
held that prior to the adoption of the “credible evidence rule” on that
date, Method 9 (visual observation by a certified inspector) was the sole
method of determining compliance with the opacity limitation. Because
the Sierra Club’s case relied exclusively on COMS data to establish
violations, it could not prove violations prior to the effective date of the
credible evidence rule.29
In United States v. Alabama Power Co. (“Alabama Power”),30 the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
interpreted the scope of the EPA’s exclusion from the CAA’s pre-
construction permit requirement for projects with the purpose of routine
maintenance, repair, and replacement (“RMRR”).31 The court held that
the exclusion applies to projects that are routine within the industry,
though not necessarily routine at any particular pollutant-emitting unit,
and to projects that do not increase the maximum hourly emissions
capacity of the unit.32
Alabama Power is one of several power plant “life extension project”
enforcement actions that the EPA began against various power
companies in 1999.33 In that case, as in others, the EPA contended
that Alabama Power constructed new, or made modifications to,
electrical power generating plants in Alabama without obtaining New
Source Review permits, thereby violating the CAA’s Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) provisions.34
[b]y using an informal, non-public, undocumented “interpretation” method of
revising the SIP before 2003, ADEM short-circuited the important protections
against uninformed and arbitrary rule-making, and it attempted to avoid entirely
EPA oversight of the SIP process . . . . For all of these reasons, ADEM’s practice
of employing the 2% de minimis rule to determine violations of the 20% opacity
limitation using COMS data was invalid under the CAA . . . .
Id. The court also noted that in 2003, ADEM submitted its two percent rule to EPA for
review. Id. at 1348.
28. Id. at 1357.
29. Id. at 1351-53. The plaintiffs argued that the federal credible evidence rule,
effective in April 1997, automatically became part of every SIP. Id. The court disagreed,
noting, among other reasons, that the EPA included in the regulation a separate provision
requiring every state to adopt, through the SIP modification process, its own credible
evidence rule, which the court stated would have been unnecessary if the federal rule had
automatically amended each SIP. Id. at 1352.
30. 372 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
31. Id. at 1307.
32. Id. at 1306-07.
33. See id. at 1304-05.
34. Id. at 1285; 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7492 (2000).
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The court’s interlocutory ruling in Alabama Power established the
scope of the RMRR exclusion to be applied in the case.35 The court
described the issues as follows: “(1) the correct legal test for determining
a physical change, including the correct legal test for determining
routine maintenance, repair, and replacement; and (2) the correct legal
test for determining a significant net emissions increase.”36 As to the
first issue, the EPA contended that the RMRR exclusion applied only to
projects that were routine at the particular unit under evaluation for a
permit, while Alabama Power argued that “routine” meant routine in the
industry, though not necessarily at any one unit.37 As to the second
issue, the EPA’s procedure called for the plant operator to estimate the
future actual annual emissions of the unit after the project, compared to
its actual emissions before the project, to determine whether an increase
in emissions would occur.38 Alabama Power contended that a project
resulted in an emissions increase only if it increased the maximum
hourly emissions capacity at a plant.39
The court reached its decision primarily by comparing two prior
district court opinions that reached contrary holdings on the same two
issues: United States v. Ohio Edison40 and United States v. Duke
Energy Corp.41 On the first question, whether the project constituted
RMRR and thus did not require a pre-construction permit, the court in
Ohio Edison ruled in favor of the EPA’s position that the RMRR
exclusion applied only to projects that were routine at the particular unit
in question.42 The court based its holding on the fact that under the
plain language of the CAA, the permit requirement applied to any
physical change at a unit.43 Therefore, any regulatory exemption to the
statute must be narrowly construed to avoid conflicting with the
statute’s clear purpose.44
On the other hand, in Duke Energy the court held that the RMRR
exclusion applied to projects that were considered routine throughout the
industry.45 The court reasoned that prior to the CAA amendments of
35. 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1285-86, 1306-07.
36. Id. at 1285-86.
37. Id. at 1289.
38. Id. at 1290.
39. Id.
40. 276 F. Supp. 2d 829 (S.D. Ohio 2003).
41. 278 F. Supp. 2d 619 (M.D.N.C. 2003); Alabama Power, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1292.
42. See Alabama Power, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1289, 1293-94. The characterizations of the
holdings of Ohio Edison and Duke Energy are those of the court in Alabama Power.
43. Id. at 1294; see 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4) (2000) (emphasis added).
44. See Alabama Power, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1293-94.
45. Id. at 1289, 1293-94.
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1977, which introduced the PSD pre-construction permit requirement,
the EPA already excluded from its new source performance requirement
regulations those modifications that were the result of maintenance,
repair, or replacement that were “routine for a source category.”46
When Congress amended the CAA in 1977 with the PSD provisions, it
explicitly defined “construction” under the 1977 provisions to include
“modification” as defined in the 1970 CAA.47 Thus, in Duke Energy the
court held that Congress intended to amend the CAA within the existing
regulatory framework, under which, for the purposes of the CAA, a
modification did not include RMRR that was routine for an entire source
category.48
As to the second question, how to calculate an emissions increase for
purposes of the permit requirement, the court again sided with the EPA
in Ohio Edison, holding that the agency’s “actual to projected future
actual” emissions test was proper and consistent with the intent and
purpose of the CAA.49 The test captured as much new construction or
modification to existing units as possible.50 Specifically, the test
captured modifications that would result in greater utilization of the
plant and, thus, greater emissions due to longer hours of operation.51
On the other hand, in Duke Energy the court employed an analysis to
the increased emissions test that was similar to its analysis of the
RMRR test.52 The court noted that the EPA promulgated a regulation
that preceeded the 1977 amendments containing the pre-construction
permit requirement, which excluded from the “physical change” category
(requiring a permit) a change solely to the plant’s hours of operation or
production rate.53 The court decided that this exclusion required the
EPA to hold the hours of operation constant in any emissions calcula-
tion, which dictated that emissions be calculated based only on a
maximum hourly rate.54 As with the RMRR test, the court concluded
that because this regulatory “hours of operation” exclusion pre-existed
the 1977 amendments and because Congress explicitly incorporated the
“modification” definition from the 1970 CAA in the 1977 amendments,
Congress intended for “modification” to receive the same regulatory
46. Id. at 1294-95; see 40 C.F.R. § 60.14(e)(1) (2005).
47. Alabama Power, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1295; see 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4).
48. Alabama Power, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1295.
49. Id. at 1290, 1297.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1298.
53. Id.; see 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(2)(iii)(f) (2005).
54. Alabama Power, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1298.
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interpretation under the 1977 provisions.55 Thus, the court held that
the EPA was required to determine whether an emissions increase had
occurred by comparing the maximum hourly emissions capacity of the
unit before and after the modification.56
In Alabama Power the court found the Duke Energy opinion persua-
sive.57 The court concluded that the EPA was not entitled to deference
in its interpretation of the CAA and its regulations.58 After considering
the extent to which deference should be applied under United States
Supreme Court precedent,59 the court concluded that the EPA was not
entitled to deference, primarily because the agency had not been
consistent in applying its regulations.60 The court stated that the
“EPA’s arguments sound more in ‘litigation position,’ which is never
entitled to Chevron deference, than they do in agency implementa-
tion/interpretation of ambiguous statutory language, which is entitled to
Chevron deference.”61
II. CLEAN WATER ACT/NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
In Florida Wildlife Federation v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers,62 the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on their claim
that the United States Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”) violated the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”)63 and the Clean Water
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1305-06.
58. Id. at 1306.
59. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
60. Alabama Power, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1306. The court noted that since the initiation
of the 1999 enforcement actions the EPA has adopted or proposed two additional rules
governing the applicability of the PSD permit provisions: a 2003 rule that would treat any
modification costing less than twenty percent of the replacement cost of the unit as routine
maintenance, and a 2005 rule applying to particulate matter emissions that would apply
only in twenty-eight eastern states. Id. at 1299, 1301. The court also noted that prior to
1999, the EPA provided conflicting guidance or interpretations of its regulations. Id. at
1306. On March 17, 2006, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit invalidated the 2003 rule, holding that the rule was contrary to the plain language
of the CAA. New York v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 6598, at *8 (D.C. Cir.
2006). Like the court that issued the Ohio Edison opinion, the District of Columbia Circuit
gave an expansive meaning to the phrase “any physical change” in CAA § 111(a)(4). Id.
at *30. However, the District of Columbia Circuit did not address the precise question at
issue in Alabama Power.
61. Alabama Power, 372 F. Supp. 2d at 1306.
62. 401 F. Supp. 2d 1298 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370 (2000).
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Act (“CWA”)64 by issuing a CWA section 404 permit to Palm Beach
County without issuing an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”).65
The court held that in granting the permit to the county to fill agricul-
tural ditches in a wetland area for the development of 535 acres of a
planned 1919-acre research park, the Corps improperly segmented the
535-acre tract from the remainder of the planned development for the
purposes of its initial Environmental Assessment (“EA”).66 Further-
more, the court stated that even if the segmentation had been proper,
the Corps nevertheless failed to adequately examine the reasonably
foreseeable indirect and cumulative effects of the 535-acre project, and
thus, the Corps failed to take the required “hard look” at all relevant
environmental concerns.67 Finally, the court held that the Corps’s EA
was deficient because the Corps’s alternatives and benefits analysis did
not match the scope of its impact analysis.68
In late 2003 Palm Beach County, Florida purchased a 1919-acre site
on which to locate a research park. The county planned to develop the
park for biomedical, technological, and pharmaceutical research with a
Scripps Research Institute as its centerpiece.69 At the time the county
acquired the site, Scripps was committed to locating its facility on a
portion of the tract, while other development was anticipated but not
confirmed.70
The 1919-acre site was historically a wetland area, but had been
converted to agriculture by the construction of ditches to drain the site.
The ditches are present throughout the site, run north to south every
360 feet, are permanently inundated, and connect to a canal that is a
tributary of a fork of the Loxahatchee River. As such, the ditches are
waters of the United States.71
In May or June 2004 the county applied for a permit to fill 21.3 acres
of drainage ditches on a 535-acre portion of the site. The county
identified this tract as the Scripps Research Park, which included the
Scripps facility, a town center with commercial and residential
construction, a health care facility, roads, and other development.72 In
64. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
65. Florida Wildlife Fed., 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1301-02, 1333.
66. Id. at 1304-05, 1333.
67. Id. at 1333.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1302-03.
70. Id. at 1303-04. In announcing the development, the county pointed to Scripps’s
business model, including the potential development of a biotech/pharmaceutical industry
cluster. Id. at 1303.
71. Id. at 1304.
72. Id. at 1305.
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February 2005 after a notice and comment period, the Corps issued an
EA for the 535-acre tract, concluding that the county had shown the
“independent utility” of the Scripps Research Park from the remainder
of the 1919-acre planned development and that proposed construction on
the tract would not have a significant impact on the environment.
Based on this conclusion, the Corps did not prepare an EIS and issued
the permit.73
The plaintiffs, the Florida Wildlife Federation and the Sierra Club,
filed suit asking the court to declare the permit invalid and to require
the Corps to prepare an EIS.74 The plaintiffs claimed that the Corps
acted arbitrarily and capriciously by failing to consider the impact of the
entire 1919-acre development when it concluded that the 535-acre
portion of the project would not have a significant impact on the
environment. More specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the Corps
unlawfully segmented the project to avoid a finding of significance; that
the Corps’s finding that the 535-acre portion had independent utility was
arbitrary and capricious; and that the Corps’s EA failed to consider and
take a hard look at all environmental concerns, including impacts,
controversy, and alternatives.75
The court first held that the Corps’s issuance of the 404 permit for the
535-acre portion of the development constituted a major federal action
under the NEPA.76 The court rejected the Corps’s argument that it did
not have sufficient control and responsibility over the entire project to
be required to consider the impact of the entire project, in part because
the Corps “conceded that it was aware of plans for future development
[beyond that of the 535-acre tract]; that it will have jurisdiction over the
next phases of development; and that it anticipates applications for those
phases.”77
The court also held that the Corps unlawfully segmented the 535-acre
tract from the larger development by authorizing the extension of a road
within the tract that the Corps knew would ultimately be connected to
roads outside the tract and would cross wetlands to do so.78 The court
agreed with the plaintiffs that by authorizing the road within the tract,
the Corps “pre-determined the ultimate alignment of the connecting PGA
[Boulevard] extension . . . through wetlands, and preclude[d] the ability
73. Id. at 1306-07.
74. Id. at 1301-02.
75. Id. at 1310-11.
76. Id. at 1311.
77. Id. at 1312.
78. Id. at 1315-16.
1078 MERCER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57
to thoroughly evaluate alternative [road] alignments.”79 The court
stated that the purpose of the anti-segmentation rule is to prevent an
agency from evading its responsibilities under the NEPA by artificially
dividing a major federal action into smaller components.80 Therefore,
the court held that although other aspects of the larger develop-
ment—including the placement of roads—had not been formally
proposed, the Corps’s approval of the road segment within the 535-acre
tract was “sufficiently contrary to the underlying policy of NEPA to
warrant review of the planned extensions . . . .”81
The court also rejected the Corps’s alternative argument that
permitting the 535-acre portion of the development was proper because
that portion had independent utility in that it could be constructed
absent the construction of other projects.82 The court stated that “[t]he
inescapable conclusion from this record is that the Research Park Project
was conceptualized as an integrated whole, progressing in phases, and
that the 535-acre project was never intended to stand alone—not, that
is, until time came to apply for a CWA permit.”83 The court noted that
in the county’s initial submissions to the Corps, the 535-acre portion of
the project was discussed as being integrated with future development
on the rest of the tract and that the independent utility concept was
introduced for the first time when other agencies began to question the
environmental impacts of the 1919-acre project.84 The court found that
the independent utility argument was developed “post-hoc as an avenue
to limit and expedite permit review.”85
The court also ruled that even if the project had not been improperly
segmented and the Corps’s finding of independent utility were supported
by the record, the Corps still failed (1) to adequately address the indirect
and cumulative effects of the 535-acre portion of the project in its EA
review; and (2) to properly balance its benefits-to-impacts analysis.86
First, the court held that the Corps failed to consider indirect effects of
the permit issuance.87 Indirect effects are those “ ‘caused by the
[federal] action and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but
are still reasonably foreseeable.’ ”88 The court focused on the fact that
79. Id. at 1315.
80. Id. at 1313.
81. Id. at 1316.
82. Id. at 1318.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1318-20.
85. Id. at 1321.
86. Id. at 1323, 1333.
87. Id. at 1324, 1326.
88. Id. at 1324.
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the 535-acre Scripps Research Center portion of the project was initially
proposed for the specific purpose of inducing other development on the
larger tract, and thus rejected the Corps’s argument that development
would have occurred on the larger tract without the issuance of the 404
permit.89 As a result, the court concluded that “[t]he Corps failed to
consider and take a ‘hard look’ at the growth-inducing effects of the
proposed project as required by NEPA.”90
Second, the court held that the Corps failed to consider the cumulative
impact of the 535-acre project.91 Cumulative impacts are those which
result from “the incremental impact of the [federal] action when added
to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions . . . .”92
The Corps again relied on a variation of the independent utility concept
and argued that it was required only to consider cumulative impacts
where other actions “are ‘so interdependent [on the action in question]
that it would be unwise or irrational to complete one without the
others.’”93 The court instead focused on the foreseeability of the
remainder of the project, noting, among other things, that more than two
months before the permit in question was issued, the county and the
Corps were discussing the next phases of the 1919-acre development.94
Finally, the court determined that the Corps had used an improper
comparison when evaluating the alternatives and benefits of the
development.95 The Corps was required to consider, and did consider,
alternatives to the project and their potential benefits as part of the EA.
However, the Corps’s regulations required it to consider the impacts,
benefits, and alternatives within the same scope.96 The court found
that while the Corps limited its analysis of potential impacts of the
project to the 535-acre tract, the Corps compared these to the benefits
of the entire 1919—acre proposed development.97 Also, in performing
its alternatives analysis, the Corps “improperly incorporated consider-
ation of the entire Research Park Project rather than limiting it to the
89. Id. at 1324-26.
90. Id. at 1326.
91. Id. at 1327-28.
92. Id. at 1326.
93. Id. at 1327. The Corps’s argument comes from Park County Resource Council v.
United States Department of Agriculture, 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1987). The district court
distinguished that case on its facts. Florida Wildlife Fed., 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1327-28.
94. Florida Wildlife Fed., 401 F. Supp. 2d at 1327-28.
95. Id. at 1331.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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scope of the proposal before the Corps.”98 For these reasons, the court
granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs.99
III. ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
In Florida Key Deer v. Brown,100 the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment to the
plaintiffs on their claim that the Federal Emergency Management
Agency’s (“FEMA”) administration of its National Flood Insurance
Program (“NFIP”) in the Florida Keys violated the Endangered Species
Act (“ESA”)101 because the program jeopardized several endangered or
threatened species.102 This litigation had been pending since 1990. In
1994 the court ordered FEMA to consult with the Fish and Wildlife
Service (“FWS”) pursuant to the ESA. In 1997 the FWS determined that
FEMA’s administration of the NFIP jeopardized several endangered
species, and FWS proposed “reasonable and prudent alternatives”
(“RPA”) to allow the NFIP to continue while protecting the species.103
The plaintiffs challenged the RPA, contending that the RPA also violated
the ESA. In 2003 the plaintiffs again issued an opinion that the NFIP
jeopardized the same species and issued RPA that were identical to the
1997 RPA. The plaintiffs amended their action to challenge the 2003
RPA, contending that the RPA and FEMA’s adoption of them were
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1333. In a subsequent remedies phase, the court set aside the permit issued
to the county and remanded the matter to the Corps for further proceedings consistent
with the present case. Florida Wildlife Fed. v. United States Army Corp of Engs., 404 F.
Supp. 2d 1352, 1366-67 (S.D. Fla. 2005). The court also enjoined the county from further
construction on the site, with certain exceptions for work that was already in place or
under way when the case was filed, pending adequate environmental review. Id.
100. 364 F. Supp. 2d 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2005). Notwithstanding the case name, the
plaintiffs were the National Wildlife Federation and other groups who brought the case on
behalf of eight endangered or threatened species of animals and plants in the Florida Keys.
Id. at 1348.
101. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531—1534 (2000).
The ESA requires all federal agencies, in consultations with FWS, to use their
authority to further the goals of the ESA by carrying out programs for the
conservation of endangered and threatened species . . . . [w]hen any action
authorized, funded or carried out by a federal agency may potentially affect a
listed species, that agency must consult with FWS to insure that the agency’s
activities are not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification
of [critical] habitat of such species.
Florida Key Deer, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1350; see 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1-2) (2000).
102. Florida Key Deer, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 1348-49, 1361.
103. Id. at 1348.
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arbitrary and capricious and violated the ESA because the RPA failed
to protect the species threatened by the NFIP.104
The court agreed with the plaintiffs on each of their three claims.
First, the court held that the FWS’s 2003 opinion regarding the threat
posed by the NFIP was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to
evaluate whether the NFIP continued to jeopardize the listed species
after FEMA’s implementation of the 1997 RPA.105 Second, the court
held that the 2003 RPA proposed by the FWS were arbitrary and
capricious because, for several reasons, they failed to protect against
jeopardy to the species.106 Finally, the court held that FEMA’s adop-
tion of the 2003 RPA was arbitrary and capricious because FEMA did
not independently evaluate the effectiveness of the RPA as proposed by
FWS.107 In a separate opinion that was issued later, the court re-
manded the matter to FEMA and the FWS for further proceedings, and
enjoined FEMA from issuing flood insurance for new developments in
the critical habitat of the listed species until FEMA could demonstrate
compliance with its order issued in the present case and with the
ESA.108
104. Id. at 1348-49. The jeopardy caused by FEMA’s insurance program is presumably
due to the development that it facilitates, though the court does not discuss this connection.
105. Id. at 1354.
106. Id. at 1354-58. Specifically, the court agreed with the plaintiffs that the 2003 RPA
illegally relied on voluntary measures for compliance, failed to protect against habitat loss
and fragmentation, and did not otherwise account for the cumulative effects of permitted
development projects within the listed species’ habitat; therefore, the 2003 RPA failed to
protect against jeopardy to the species as a result of the NFIP. Id.
107. Id. at 1358-59. The court also held in favor of the plaintiffs on two related issues:
that the 2003 RPA failed to protect against adverse modification of the critical habitat of
the silver rice rat, a listed species, and that FEMA failed to implement any conservation
plan for the listed species as required by the ESA. Id. at 1359-61.
108. Florida Key Deer v. Brown, 386 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1294 (S.D. Fla. 2005).
